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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CARLOS HERRERA, and K E N N Y 
NAVAREZ, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8804 
At trial, commencing on July 25, 1957, before the Sec-
ond Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the 
appellants were convicted of the crime of rape. The evi-
dence adduced at trial disclosed that the incident occurred 
on the outskirts of Ogden on the night of June 6, 1957. The 
State's evidence was to the effect that the appellants raped 
the prosecutrix, a married woman, 15 years of age. The 
evidence, as presented by the defense, conceded that the 
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appellants had each engaged in sexual intercourse but was 
to the effect that such acts were voluntary and with the 
prosecutrix's consent. The question of resistance was there-
fore the substantial factual issue before the Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EXTENT OF CROSS EXAMINATION OF 
THE DEFENSE WITNESS BORELLA AS PER-
MITTED BY THE COURT WAS NOT ERROR. 
POINT II. 
THE EXAMINATION BY THE PROSECUTION 
OF CERTAIN OF ITS OWN WITNESSES WAS 
NOT ERROR. 
POINT III. 
IF THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERRORS, 
SUCH ERRORS, WHEN VIEWED TOGETHER, 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE 
DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF 
CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS. 
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3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EXTENT OF CROSS EXAMINATION OF 
THE DEFENSE WITNESS BORELLA AS PER-
MITTED BY THE COURT WAS NOT ERROR. 
Appellants object to certain cross examination of their 
witness Borella. See pages 171 to 172 of the transcript and 
pages 5, 6 and 7 of appellants' brief. The District Attorney 
in attempting to impeach the witness through cross exam-
ination brought out previous arrests and instances of mis-
conduct. 
The law in this country is not uniform in that area 
concerning the permissible extent of cross examination of 
a witness for impeachment purposes. It is admitted that a 
majority of the courts hold that evidence of arrests, with-
out showing convictions, may not be admitted. See Wig-
more on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 979, Vol. III. Ap-
pellants do not object here to the introduction of evidence 
of arrests, or of specific instances of misconduct, because 
that was not done, but rather, object to the questions put 
to the witness by the prosecutor. The scope of cross ex-
amination is broad. The H oughensen case, cited by appel-
lants, State v. Houghensen (1936 Utah), 64 P. 2d 229, con-
tains at pages 238 and 239 a number of principles which 
the court suggests as guides in the conduct of cross exam-
ination. Rule (3) as stated by the court is as follows: 
"Questions whose only object could be to call 
for answers to affect the credibility of the witness 
and which answers would tend to degrade his or her 
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4 
character, but not tend to subject such witness to 
punishment for a felony, are permissible over a gen-
eral objection as to their relevancy or competency, 
in the sound discretion of the court." 
It is submitted that the trial court has broad discretion in 
determining the extent of cross examination of a witness. 
A number of decisions rest on the principle that the admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence of arrests is left with the sound 
discretion of the trial court. See Tollifson v. People (1910 
Colo.), 112 P. 794; State v. Bowers (1921 Kan.), 194 P. 
650; and Denny v. State (1921 Ind.), 129 N. E. 308. 
It is further submitted that the principal obstacle upon 
which Point I of appellants' argument falls is that the 
error, if such was committed, was not prejudicial. It is 
alleged that the admission of the evidence "destroyed the 
value of his [the witness's] evidence in the eyes of the 
jury", but that is mere supposition on the part of appel-
lants. The attempts to impeach the witness Borella were 
only efforts to reflect on the witness's character for verac-
ity. Considering the nature of the cross examination, the 
questions put, it could not have seriously discredited the 
witness. It is to be remembered that this was not the ac-
cused who was being cross examined. Even assuming for 
the sake of argument appellants' position, analysis of the 
witness's testimony reveals that it played an insignificant 
part in the case for the defense. In substance, the witness 
Borella testified that he had previously "dated" the prose-
cutrix; that he was in the car together with the prosecutrix 
and others earlier during the evening of the incident; that 
she drank beer and that she was kissing boys in the car; 
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5 
all relating to the witness's acquaintance with the prosecu-
trix and to her conduct on the evening of the alleged assault. 
His testimony did not go directly to the fundamental issues 
in a rape conviction. He did not testify that he had ever 
had sexual relations with the prosecutrix, nor did he testify 
of her character as to chastity. He was not present at the 
time of the rape and therefore could offer no testimony on 
the essential question of resistance. 
It is noted that a number of the cited cases in appel-
lants' brief, pages 8 and 9 directed to this point, are cases 
which involve the cross examination of the accused. Here 
we are concerned with the cross examination of witnesses 
-not the parties to the action. In both Ross v. United 
States (1937 C. C. A. 7th), 93 F. 2d 950, and State v. Nyhus, 
129 N. W. 71, cited on page 9 of appellants' brief, the ques-
tion concerned the cross examination of the defendant. So 
far as the matter of prejudicial error arises, it is submitted 
that error committed in the impeachment of a party would 
likely result in more prejudice than error committed in the 
impeachment of a witness, not a party. 
POINT II. 
THE EXAMINATION BY THE PROSECUTION 
OF CERTAIN OF ITS OWN WITNESSES WAS 
NOT ERROR. 
It is alleged as Point II of appellants' brief that the 
court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach various 
of its witnesses; specifically Dr. Hirst and Johnny Domin-
guez. 
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The redirect examination of Dr. Hirst by the prosecu-
tion as recorded on pages 56 and 57 of the transcript, al-
though involving leading questions, did not constitute im-
peachment of the witness. There are two grounds upon 
which a party may cross examine or ask leading questions 
of his own witness: (1) where the party is surprised by 
the witness's testimony; and (2) to refresh a witness's 
memory or recollection. The following general principle 
is quoted from 98 C. J. S.: 
"Page 236, § 428, WITNESSES. 
"To refresh a witness's memory or recollection 
it may be permissible to ask leading questions, and 
to call his attention to previous conversations or 
statements had with relation to the subject of his 
testimony." 
Page 367, § 484, WITNESSES. 
"A party may cross-examine his own witness 
when he has been surprised by the witness's testi-
mony." 
See also 58 Am. Jur. 342, Sec. 618, Witnesses. This court, 
in the case of Morton v. Hood (1943 Utah), 143 P. 2d 434, 
affirmed the rule that a party under certain circumstances 
may cross examine his own witness. The court said: 
"We are of the opinion that when a witness has 
made statements on a prior occasion which would 
induce counsel acting in good faith to call such per-
son as a witness, and when testifying such witness 
gives testimony materially different from the prior 
statement; the party so surprised and misled by such 
adverse testimony, under proper circumstances, 
should not only be. permitted to ask leading ques-
tions to refresh the recollection of the witness as to 
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the prior declarations, but if the witness asserts that 
such questions or reference to alleged prior declara-
tions do not refresh his memory, or he denies mak-
ing such statements, or refuses to answer, or even 
professes that he is unable to remember; proof of 
such prior statements should be received, not as sub-
stantive evidence of the facts about which such 
statements were made, but to offset the effect of 
the surprise adverse testimony." 
It is noted that on page 58 of the transcript in response to 
counsel's objection, the court said: "You may proceed on 
surprise." 
As a second argument contained within Point II of 
appellants' brief, it is urged that the court erred in per-
mitting the prosecutor to ask certain questions of his own 
witness, one Johnny Dominguez. The prosecution had called 
this witness who had been present during the early hours 
of the evening of the assault and who testified as to the 
persons present and what transpired during the time that 
he was present. He testified that he was a very good friend 
of both defendants. The following testimony is quoted from 
page 246 of the transcript, and includes that which appel-
lants object to: 
"Q. You may cross examine. One other ques-
tion. Have you been in the Industrial School? 
now. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You have been in a lot of trouble have you? 
"A. I haven't been in trouble for a long time 
"Q. You haven't been in any trouble for a long 
time now. Is that right? 
"A. Two years ago." 
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It is noted that earlier during the witness's testimony the 
court allowed the prosecutor to lead the witness, comment-
ing that he was "obviously reluctant." 
The transcript reveals that appellants made no objec-
tion at trial to the questions. It is a general rule of appeal 
law that an appellate court will consider only those ques-
tions as were raised and reserved at trial. See 3 Am. Jur. 
25, Sec. 246, Appeal and Error. The rule is one of fairness, 
based on the reasonable requirement that reversals should 
not be granted on grounds of objection which might have 
been obviated by a timely objection raised at trial. Prior 
to the adoption of the present rules of civil procedure, it 
was necessary, in order to preserve a question on appeal, 
to make exception to the court ruling at the trial. Present 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, 
at the time the ruling or order of the court is made 
or sought, makes known to the court the action which 
he desires the court to take or his objection to the 
action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if 
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or 
order at the time it is made, the absence of an ob-
jection does not thereafter prejudice him." 
Although the section abolishes the requirement that an ex-
ception be taken, it certainly implies that in order to pre-
serve the question on appeal the party either make known 
to the court the action he desires the court to take or else 
that he objuct to the court's action. In the instant case, 
appellants remained silent. It is conceded that in certain 
situations where the error is of such magnitude or mani-
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9 
festly prejudicial to the accused, that the Appellate Court 
should not refuse to consider the question, even though ob-
jection was not made below. The error presented to this 
court is technical and of minor significance. It is submitted 
that inasmuch as appellants failed to raise objection at trial, 
they cannot now demand that this court consider the ques-
tion. 
It is further submitted that it was within the discre-
tion of the trial judge to permit the questions. The latitude 
allowed a pary in cross examining his own witness is gen-
erally a matter within the discretionary powers of the trial 
judge. See 98 C. J. S. 367, Sec. 484, Witnesses. The court 
here, in the exercise of such discretion, permitted the ques-
tions. This court, in the case of Xenakis v. Garrett Freight-
lines (1954 Utah), 265 P. 2d 1007, said: 
"There is no doubt that, where a party is sur-
prised at finding that a witness believed to be fav-
orable is in fact adverse, it is permissible to cross-
examine the witness and to put leading questions 
to him, and the extent to which this may be done is, 
generally speaking, within the discretion of the pre-
siding judge. * * *" 
POINT III. 
IF THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERRORS, 
SUCH ERRORS, WHEN VIEWED TOGETHER, 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE 
DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF 
CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
Defendants have raised specifically three errors, dis-
cussed in Points I and II. It is significant that all three 
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touch merely on collateral matters. They do not involve the 
testimony of the prosecutrix or of either of the defendants, 
and they do not relate to the primary issue before the trial 
court, viz., whether the prosecutrix resisted and was over-
come by force or violence. (It was conceded by appellants 
that they engaged in sexual intercourse with the prosecu-
trix.) 
The first alleged error related to questions asked for 
the purpose of impeaching one of.appellants' witnesses. The 
second concerned leading questions asked of a doctor, the 
State's witness, pertaining to a statement previously made 
by the witness indicating abrasions on the prosecutrix's 
legs. The third related to impeachment questions asked 
of one of the State's witnesses. 
Section 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that where 
error has been committed it shall not be presumed to have 
resulted in prejudice and that the Appellate Court shall 
not give regard to errors which do not affect the substan-
tial rights of the accused. It is submitted that the errors 
here, if any, were minor, technical in nature and not preju-
dicial to the rights of appellants. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS. 
The appellants attack the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the conviction. A basic principle of appellate 
review provides that an appellate court will not ~eview 
questions of fact; that being the function of the jury. The 
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court may, however, make a determination of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and if the verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence, the reviewing court will not disturb 
it. See 3 Am. Jur., Sees. 883 and 887, Appeal and Error, 
and 5A C. J. S., Sec. 1647, Appeal and Error. 
This court has held that where there is evidence to 
support the jury's verdict it will not be overturned by a 
reviewing court. Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Cor-
poration (1949 Utah), 202 P. 2d 727; see also Angerman 
v. Edgemon (1930 Utah), 290 P. 169. The above stated rule 
applies to criminal as well as to civil verdicts. See State v. 
Mann (1941 No. Caro.), 13 S. E. 2d 247, where the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina said : 
"It is not the province of this court to weigh 
the testimony and determine what the verdict should 
have been, but only to see whether there was any 
evidence for the jury to consider; if there was, the 
jury alone could determine its weight." 
See also State v. Johnson (1955 Ida.), 287 P. 2d 425. There 
was evidence here to support the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should af-
firm the conviction of appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
GARY L. THEURER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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